Over the last decade in college football, I think we have seen a vast change in the way head coaches are viewed, and the way rebuilding a program is viewed. The genesis of this change may have been three first three years of the current decade, 2000-2002. In 2000, second year coach Bob Stoops led Oklahoma to a national championship. In 2001, first year coach Larry Coker led Miami to a national championship. In 2002, second year coach Jim Tressel led Ohio State to a national championship. Three years, three different coaches, three national titles, all won in two seasons at a school or less. Suddenly, it looked like all an athletic director needed to do was find the right man for the job, and he could have a national title for his program, too. This helped usher in an era of multi-million dollar contracts, as athletic directors were willing to pay up for the next young genius coach who could deliver a turnaround and a national title in two short years, and the inflation of contracts for new coaches caused salaries to rise as athletic directors sought to keep winning head coaches from being poached by other schools.

In the process, the timetable for a program to be rebuilt changed. It was no longer acceptable for a coach to be given four years to completely change out personnel from a previous regime, install his own system and players, and show results in the form of winning seasons. Big-money contracts meant big results were needed NOW, and the timetable was shortened, with coaches expected to win and win big in just their second season. If Stoops and Coker and Tressel could do it, why not Big State U's million dollar man, too?

The big-dollar contracts for new coaches meant higher ticket prices for the fans, which meant even less patience for rebuilding. If fans were going to pay high prices for tickets to go to games, they wanted to see results NOW.

With this new shortened timetable for rebuilding, two new schools of thought came out in how to rebuild a program. One school was what I refer to as the Stoops model, because Stoops embraced it immediately upon arrival at Oklahoma. Stoops said he didn't want to talk about rebuilding, because seniors don't want to hear about rebuilding, they want to win now. Stoops felt he owed it to his seniors to do everything he could to win games in his first year, so he played some true freshmen like Quentin Griffin in an effort to win NOW, not wait until later. Stoops also adopted his offensive and defensive attack to the players he had available, adjusting to do what would best help him win games now. 

The second school of thought will be referred to as the Meyer model. I read where Urban Meyer once said the first thing you do when you come into a new program as a head coach is break the whole program down, and then begin to build it back up in your image. Under this model, you are installing your system as is, regardless of the talent on the roster, possibly sacrificing wins in the short term for experience in the system and knowledge in the long-term. Under this model, you may have a lot of losses early on, and experience some significant player attrition, as the coach weeds out the players who don't fit his system, and tries to bring in 'his' guys. A perfect example of the Meyer model is what Franchione did at Texas A&M. Despite having a squad built to run a 3-4 defense, he insisted they run Carl Torbush's multiple 4-3 defense beginning in 2003, disregarding a lack of talent for that scheme. Franchione also redshirted heavily, to the point of putting walk-ons in starting positions after injuries hit, because he was so concerned about preserving player eligibility for future seasons. This led to a 4-8 season in 2003, record losses, and much dissatisfaction with Franchione. One of the problems with the Meyer model is that it can cause the fans to have even less patience for the rebuilding process. Another problem with the Meyer model is that it can make for a massive rebuilding job when a new coach comes in, because he is dealing with players who were recruited and developed to run only a certain system. This prolongs the rebuilding process for the program, because now you are trying to rebuild a program that already had a foundation wrecked just a few years previous. The Meyer model requires a longer period for the program to develop, with a possible losing season expected the first year, a winning season and a minor bowl hoped for the second year, and then a winning team which competes for conference and national titles expected in years three and four. After year four, if the system is working, recruiting should be developing talented depth to the point where rebuilding is not needed, and you are simply reloading with young talent every year to replace players who have used up their eligibility.

The current situation at A&M requires we embrace a timetable required by the Meyer model, simply because there are so many holes that need to be filled, with regards to player personnel. Mike Sherman showed last season that he is able to adopt some principles of the Stoops model, in that he changed the focus of our offensive scheme to emphasize the passing game, simply because it would mean a better chance to win NOW, even though Sherman's system calls for an emphasis on the running game. Sherman is doing everything he currently can to get us winning NOW, while also trying to build a substainable program for the future.

The challenge for Aggies everywhere will to be patient while giving Sherman time to right the ship and get the program moving in the right direction again. Given the high prices we pay to watch Aggie football, being patient is hard, because we have been promised results before, only to get burned. We're eager for a return on our investment, but we need to keep the faith that Sherman's recruiting and player development will pay dividends in the future, making for a better and more successful football program.